CSE can be seen across a wide range of crime types therefore the use of flags is considered important for two main purposes:

1. To assist operational Police officers to better safeguard children who may be at risk (or further risk) of sexual exploitation and bring those who offend against children to justice. For example to assist a frontline non-specialist officer in identifying a potential CSE incident when stopping a vehicle at 3am. This will lead them to make effective safeguarding decisions and subsequently CSE specialist staff can ensure those children are subject to statutory safeguarding processes.
2. To ensure that analytical products which form the basis for Police (and partner) decision making and policy, are as accurate as possible, and reflect the true threat.

In developing this guidance, it is understood that Police forces utilise different IT systems and structures to effectively respond to CSE. As a result this guidance is necessarily broad and refers to functions rather than specific job titles.

The guidance does not include flags attached to specific crimes or incidents, but focuses on victims, offenders and locations.

Intelligence relating to a child at risk of CSE, received by a Police force will be subject to a risk assessment process. This is ideally completed in a multi-agency forum utilising an accepted assessment tool such as SERAF. The flagging process should distinguish between children who are at low risk of CSE (and therefore do not trigger a safeguarding strategy meeting) and those who are at moderate or high risk (and therefore do trigger a formal safeguarding strategy meeting), in order to allow CSE specialist staff to easily identify children subject to the strategy process.

The use of a single flag with the appropriate comment indicating degree of risk is the simplest, most effective method to achieve this distinction. In order to ensure consistency, the flag should be created by a CSE specialist (this could be a member of a CSE team or a CSE coordinator depending on the Force structure) and be subject to review at least every 6 months or when the risk to the child is known to have changed. The single flag should be worded along the lines of ‘At risk of CSE’ rather than ‘Victim of CSE’ in order to clearly include those where exploitation has yet to be confirmed.

There should be an effective quality assurance process in place to ensure flags are accurate and subject to timely review and update.

It is known that children at risk of CSE often travel across Police borders for a variety of reasons, including being trafficked by offenders; being coerced into criminal activity such as County Lines; or whilst attempting to return home following an out of county care placement. It is important therefore, that a PNC marker is also placed against the child, reflecting the entry on the local force system, to ensure appropriate safeguarding is considered. Wording of such a marker could be: **DO NOT DISCLOSE TO SUBJECT** AT RISK OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION. CONSIDER CIRCUMSTANCES AND USE OF POLICE PROTECTION POWERS. SUBMIT INTELLIGENCE OF ALL ENCOUNTERS AND ASSOCIATES TO (designated Force email address).

Flagging of offenders is more problematic as there is no statutory risk assessment process for someone subject to a perpetrator intelligence submission, although some Forces will have some form of process in place. Forces should also be mindful of the possibility of malicious intelligence submission leading to erroneous markers being placed on innocent individuals. Whilst this can never be definitive, it is suggested that markers are placed against individuals who:

• Are formal suspects for an offence against a child following the report of a crime
• Have been the subject of credible intelligence. This could be intelligence from two or more independent sources or intelligence corroborated in some other manner.

The use of a single CSE perpetrator flag (with the ability to indicate level of risk posed, where possible) is the simplest process but again, there needs to be an effective quality assurance and management process in place, to ensure accuracy and timely review and update. This is especially important to prevent action being taken against an individual (such as being stopped at point of departure from UK) based on erroneous or out of date information.

As a minimum, flags should be reviewed at least every six months, or when the risk posed by an individual is known to have changed.

As research has shown offenders often travel widely, a PNC marker should be placed against the perpetrator, reflecting the entry on the local force system. Wording of such a marker could be: **DO NOT DISCLOSE TO SUBJECT** THIS PERSON IS OF INTEREST TO CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION TEAM. CONSIDER CIRCS OF POLICE CONTACT AND USE OF POLICE PROTECTION POWERS. SUBMIT INTELLIGENCE OF ALL ENCOUNTERS AND ASSOCIATES TO (designated Force email address).

It is known that CSE offenders travel utilising private transport and therefore it seems logical to flag the vehicles they use in order to promote increased LE activity/disruption. There are several options including PNC Act markers (that require an officer to react and undertake a specific action); PNC Information markers (that do not require a specific response but will make any officer conducting a PNC check aware of potential CSE activity); and use of local ANPR hotlists, again to trigger specific activity in the event of a ANPR activation.

Unless there is a specific threat (e.g. a suspect to be arrested) the use of a PNC Information marker is considered most appropriate. This will increase awareness on the part of an officer checking the vehicle and ensure that the use of Police protective powers are considered, together with an intelligence submission to the Force that placed the marker. Possible information marker could include: **DO NOT DISCLOSE TO SUBJECT** THIS VEHICLE IS LINKED TO (insert name) A PERSON OF INTEREST TO CSE TEAM. CONSIDER CIRCS OF POLICE CONTACT AND USE OF POLICE PROTECTION POWERS. SUBMIT INTELLIGENCE OF ALL ENCOUNTERS AND ASSOCIATES TO (designated Force email address).

The use of PNC ACT markers and local ANPR hotlists in anything other than immediate safeguarding cases could result in numerous activations each day, each requiring a Police response, when no unlawful activity is ongoing. PNC markers should be subject to regular review to ensure the vehicle is still linked to the perpetrator and remains relevant. Reviews every 90 days are suggested initially.

The use of CSE flags around locations is considered to be of limited benefit to operational officers as CSE can take place at any location which children frequent (e.g. almost every fast food outlet with free wi-fi). It is anticipated that CSE ‘hotspots’ will be highlighted through multi-agency safeguarding (MASE) meetings and highlighted to local officers through briefings.

Clearly a young person over the age of 18 years cannot be a victim of CSE, however the risk of exploitation does not end on their 18th birthday. The powers available to the officer to intervene will be different when dealing with an adult, but a flag highlighting this ongoing risk remains useful to an officer responding to an incident involving the vulnerable individual. The flag could be ‘At risk of sexual exploitation’ with any free text field showing that the individual has previously been a victim of CSE.

CSE managers should change the flag on the individual turning 18, with public protection unit vulnerable adult staff taking responsibility for ongoing reviews and updating. Review of the flag should take place at least every 6 months or when the risk to the individual is known to have changed.

This guidance is intended to bring a degree of consistency and accuracy to existing victim offender and location flagging processes used in Police forces across the UK in order to assist front line staff in dealing with incidents, and to improve the value of analytical products. Due to the variety of IT systems and organisational structures in place, it cannot be too specific and the above is considered the minimum that forces should consider. The use of additional flags to meet local circumstances may be appropriate provided they remain accurate, relevant and subject to effective quality assurance and review processes.

The West Midlands ROCU Regional CSE coordinator and analyst organised and co-ordinated Regional Quarterly CSE Disruption Meetings. The meetings are aimed at developing and sharing good practice, and encouraging the disruption of CSE offenders.

The Disruption Meetings are attended by operational CSE Police investigators with representatives attending from all forces. Operational partners also form part of the meeting structure with attendance from Social Care, third sector voluntary groups, Ofsted, Public Health, NWG and The Centre of Expertise. CSE Co-ordinators and Analysts from other regions have also attended to observe the good practice and assist in implementing similar meetings and processes in their regions.

Following the success of the West Midlands Disruption Meetings, most regions have now implemented similar multi-partnership disruption processes and procedures to identify community hotspots and target offenders. Partnership attendance ranges from Police, Schools Inspectorate, SIA, Prevent officers, Local Authorities, Immigration, Probation, regional threat leads and GAIN coordinators. Several behavioural orders such as CAWNs, SHPOs, and SROs are being used to disrupt CSE in all forces to great effect.

Regional coordinators have encouraged local and regional partnership working by sharing good practice in a series of regional conferences where procedures and processes can be discussed and shared.

Following a scoping exercise, a gap was identified in sharing best practice of previous and ongoing disruption activities across the North Eastern region. After discussions at the regional SGG, and with the backing of the Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU) lead it was requested that this was addressed by a series of presentations and discussions. The aim of these was to provide a forum to share best practice around intelligence sharing and disruption tactics across the three North Eastern force areas and signpost relevant authorities towards additional resources which were available to them.

As a result a CSE Disruption/Intelligence conference was held on 16 October 2017, fully supported by the three CSE force leads, together with the lead from NERSOU.

Conference objectives:

1. Soft intelligence – The conference aimed to identify where the intelligence gaps were and ensure effective assessment and tactical response.
2. Disruption – The conference aimed to identify and enable each force to demonstrate and share best practice. Making forces aware of the support and tactical options available to them e.g. Polygraph, GAIN, Sanctuary case study etc. The objective was to assist each force to achieve their individual targets within their CSE National benchmarking action plans, and local action plans.

• 150 people from the three regional forces and key external partners
• Regional and force threat leads
• Forces Communications leads/Inspectors
• Multi Agency Public Protection arrangements (MAPPA)
• Protecting Vulnerable People (PVP) Departments
• Force Intelligence Leads
• Police Online Investigation Teams (POLIT)
• Probation leads
• Local Authority leads
• Local Children Safeguarding Board (LSCB) leads
• Education
• Health
• Third party sector leads.

The conference aimed to look initially at the referral process to raise awareness of the necessity and mechanisms of sharing information / intelligence, and improve internal and external partnership working and support. This presentation discussed the National Intelligence Model (NIM) and outlined how the police evaluate information once it is received, convert it into intelligence and who it is then shared with e.g. partners, other forces, government agencies, in order to drive problem solving initiatives by target hardening.

The necessity to share information was further examined with presentations and case studies from regional Undercover Online (UCOL) leads which highlighted their work in assisting forces and agencies in investigating CSEA crime, sharing of Indecent Images of Children (IIOC), and associated criminal activities carried out online.

The conference flowed into a presentation and demonstration of ‘Polygraph’. Polygraph is now being used in some forces for intelligence purposes in relation to post conviction Registered Sex Offenders (RSO’s). Sensors connected to the Polygraph machine are placed on the subject’s body, and record breathing rates, pulse and blood pressure while the subject is asked a series of questions. The presentation highlighted the effectiveness of using this new technology, ‘eye detect and polygraph’, to enhance intelligence capture and improve risk assessments. A subsequent case study was explored which demonstrated the success rate in identifying vulnerable victims.

The three regional forces of Cleveland, Durham and Northumbria then gave presentations to share good practice from their respective force areas with partners and Police practitioners.

Cleveland detailed a national campaign between a major fast food franchise, themselves and Barnardo’s where, following a scoping exercise on missing from home interviews, this franchise, was identified as a common meeting place. A training package was prepared and delivered to all staff regionally and made available nationally to raise their awareness of warning signs for CSEA. This was supported by a training package developed and delivered to all targeted schools to safeguard children and disrupt potential CSE activity.

Durham presented the comprehensive work they are carrying out alongside Dr Joe Sullivan, a Forensic Psychologist, looking at Intervention to Protect a Child (IPC). This initiative is at the forefront in raising psychological awareness and allows for the development of intelligence to support Police and partners in identifying CSEA offenders. The presentation and associated case study demonstrated how IPC supported active investigations by identifying tactical options and developing proactive investigative opportunities with a view to arresting offenders or disrupting activities.

Northumbria presented on the much publicised work carried out by the team from Operation Sanctuary. They gave a series of case studies highlighting the disruption activities carried out to safeguard victims, arrest offenders, prevent (further) offending, and build the intelligence picture using a multi-agency approach to effectively engineer subjects away from the potential of criminality.

The conference was closed by the regional Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) Coordinator who described how GAIN can assist Police and partners in disrupting CSEA activities by using their comprehensive network of agencies to target Organised Crime Group (OCG) activity. This presentation demonstrated the referral process via a case study showing how multi-agency collaboration between public sector enforcement agencies, relevant private sectors, and trade organisations, allowed information & intelligence to be shared to enable joint investigations to be carried out to target and disrupt major criminal activity.

Best practice has been developed as the regional CSEA coordinator has weekly meetings with the GAIN coordinator to discuss regional threats and areas of concern. This ensures that the relevant agencies work together to share appropriate information and use their collective influences and contacts to tackle regional and local crime issues including CSEA.